The STOP/Contre‑Feu narrative and the Tobacco Tactics profile both emphasise that some on the GINN Leadership Team previously worked for or with multinational tobacco companies and then infer a present‑day link or alignment with those firms’ lobbying objectives. That move is a textbook guilt‑by‑association tactic: past disclosed employment or sector experience is presented as sufficient to characterise current independent work as part of a corporate lobbying ecosystem, even when no material or financial link is demonstrated.
GINN is not owned by, funded by, or contractually controlled by multinational tobacco manufacturers, and GINN’s own descriptions emphasise a focus on novel, reduced‑risk products and an internal commitment to disclose external interests. The leap from “some GINN personnel once worked in tobacco companies” to “GINN is today a tobacco‑industry lobby vehicle” is therefore ungrounded and ignores common practice in many policy areas, where former industry, government or NGO staff participate transparently in new roles without being treated as covert proxies for previous employers.
Why the “same products, therefore same lobby” argument fails
The report’s suggestion that organisations like GINN should be treated as part of the transnational tobacco lobby because they advocate for product categories in which some transnational tobacco companies are also active conflates overlapping subject‑matter with overlapping interests. In many regulated fields—such as pharmaceuticals, energy or transport—independent associations, academic groups and consumer advocates sometimes support specific technologies or regulatory models that are also favoured by some companies, without being subsumed into those companies’ lobbying operations.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the claim that supporting reduced‑risk nicotine products automatically aligns an organisation with “Big Tobacco” would implicate public health bodies and expert groups that recommend or supply non‑combustible nicotine as a cessation or substitution option, solely because some of those products are also marketed by tobacco firms. That is inconsistent with the way evidence‑based tobacco control has evolved, particularly in countries that have achieved very low smoking prevalence by integrating safer alternatives into their strategies.
Harm reduction as a legitimate public health strategy
Harm reduction is not a “commercial spin” invented by industry, but a long‑standing public health approach used in areas such as HIV prevention, drug dependence and road safety. In tobacco control specifically, the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) defines “tobacco control” in Article 1d as encompassing “a range of supply, demand and harm reduction strategies” aimed at improving population health by reducing tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke, which embeds harm reduction in the treaty’s core concepts.
Independent analyses of the FCTC and global tobacco control note that this definition explicitly includes harm reduction alongside more traditional demand‑ and supply‑side measures, and argue that a balanced approach requires making room for safer nicotine products that can displace smoking among adults. Countries highlighted in such analyses for achieving rapid declines in smoking prevalence have often combined strong tobacco control with support or tolerance for reduced‑risk nicotine options, demonstrating that harm reduction can work in practice when managed responsibly.
Re‑centring the debate on youth protection and risk
The STOP/Contre‑Feu campaign focuses on industry interference in EU policymaking and the need for strict implementation of FCTC Article 5.3, documenting meetings and lobbying spend by tobacco companies and related entities. However, bundling independent harm‑reduction advocates into “tobacco lobby” lists without clear material or financial links risks turning a governance issue about transparency and undue influence into a broad, personalised attack on anyone arguing for proportionate regulation of non‑combustible nicotine products.
GINN’s stated agenda—developing standards, preventing youth access, and advocating for proportionate regulation of reduced‑risk products for adults—is consistent with public health objectives that seek to minimise youth uptake of nicotine while enabling smokers to move to less harmful options. Portraying this position as inherently suspect, or as a “false” narrative simply because it conflicts with abstinence‑only preferences of some funders and NGOs, diverts attention from practical questions: how best to keep all nicotine products out of children’s hands, how to reduce exposure to smoke, and how to structure regulation so adults who smoke have realistic routes to lower‑risk alternatives.
